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I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondent has failed to provide any cogent argument regarding why Appellant should 
not prevail. His brief subsists of conclusory statements without evidentiary support from the 
record or case law. In fact, he has failed to present one case where its holding of a case supports 
his arguments. In contrast, Appellant has provided meticulous arguments and case law in support 
of her assertions. The Magistrate did not stay within the outer boundaries of its discretion and did 
not reach its decision through an exercise of reason. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
Magistrate and hold that the minor child should primarily reside with Appellant under the 
previous 2013 Custody Order. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN FINDING A MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
Respondent argues that "Mother moving from Virginia to Idaho"; "Mother plans to move 
back to Virginia and Mother has a history and pattern of moving B often and call (sic) into 
question the stability of B while in Mother's care and custody"; and "Father has lost his job in 
the oil fields and earns about a third or twenty-five percent of what he earned there" are all 
events supported by evidence justifying the Court changing primary custody of the minor 
children from Mother to Father. Yet, Respondent has failed to provide any citation to the record 
as to how the child was affected by these changes and failed to present any case law supporting 
his contentions. Without any connection between the said event and effect on the child, the 
Magistrate Court has adopted change of custody rules for per se events. For instance, moving 
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five times within the lifetime of a child to this Magistrate Court is per se unstable, regardless of 
the child's excellence in school , or being well adjusted, and having good relations with both 
parents. 
1. The conclusion of a material and substantial change of circumstances based 
on "Mother's move from Virginia to Idaho" is an abuse of discretion. 
While Respondent claims "[t]his fact alone would be sufficient to warrant a change in the 
custody and visitation order", he fails to provide any analysis whatsoever on that conclusion is 
based in reason and within the outer bounds of the Magistrate's discretion. It is undisputed that 
the move from Virginia to Idaho was approved by Respondent. He failed to request or exercise 
any visitation outside of what was allowed under the 2013 Custody Order. Notably the 2013 
Custody Order did not require Respondent to exercise of all the custody he was awarded. He also 
failed to cite to any portion of the record that showed any detrimental effect upon the child. 
Respondent provided merely conclusory statements without any support in law or the record. 
2. The conclusion of a material and substantial change of circumstances based 
on "Mother plans to move back to Virginia and Mother has a history and 
patter of moving B often and call (sic) into question the stability of B while in 
Mother's care and custody" was an abuse of discretion. 
While Respondent claims that this determination would "appear" to be well within the 
discretion of the Magistrate, this conclusion was not within the Magistrate's outer discretionary 
limits and was not based in reason. As previously argued by Appellant and cited by Respondent, 
whether there is a material and substantial change of circumstances depends on the effect it has 
on the child. See Doe v. Doe, 161 Idaho 67, 383 P.3d 1237, 1241 (2016). It is undisputed that a 
number of the school changes took place at the direction of the school. What the Magistrate did 
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and Respondent wishes to have upheld is that if a person moves five times in ten years and 
moves school five times, then Idaho family courts must conclude that a material and substantial 
change of circumstances has occurred warranting a change in custody. Respondent desires a per 
se conclusion that the custodial parent is unstable in that situation and that custody should go to 
the other parent. Unfortunately, this eliminates the exercise of reason that the magistrate courts 
are supposed to implement in each case. Here, it is undisputed that a number of the school moves 
were in B.G.S. 's best interests to keep her in academic programs that provided sufficient 
intellectual stimulation. Respondent has failed to marshal any evidence to this Court that would 
support any finding that B.G.S. was detrimentally affected by these school changes because there 
is none. 
The Magistrate's decision is even more extreme when it still changed custody from 
mother to father on reconsideration when Appellant provided sworn testimony and evidence that 
she would not be moving to Virginia but staying in Boise, and that the Shelley school district 
would be unable to accommodate B.G.S. 's special needs. This was unrefuted evidence. 
Essentially, Mother acquiesced to the Magistrate's stated concern regarding a move back to 
Virginia (even though it was allowed under the 2013 Custody Order). The magistrate's 
conclusion could not be supported on reconsideration as Appellant agreed to stay in Idaho, just 
as Respondent had initially requested. Where the Mother lived was irrelevant to the magistrate. 
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3. The conclusion of a material and substantial change of circumstances 
regarding child custody based on "Father has lost his job in the oil fields and 
earns about a third or twenty-five percent of what he earned there" was an 
abuse of discretion. 
As previously argued, this conclusion cannot be supported based on reason. The 
Magistrate clearly anticipated a move by Appellant to Virginia in its initial decision. It did not 
change the cost allocations for the parties from the 2013 Custody Order. It is undisputed that it 
would cost Respondent the same amount of money no matter the custody arrangement. The 
necessity to modify child custody based upon a change of income cannot be supported as 
Respondent would pay the same amount in travel costs regardless of the custody arrangement. 
4. Appellant's reliance on Doe and Evans was appropriate. 
Respondent asserts: "The mother's reliance on the cases of Doe ... and Evans ... is 
misplaced and not relevant to the facts in this matter." Contrary to Respondent's assertions, Doe 
and Evans are relevant cases as they both deal with the standard of a substantial and material 
change of circumstances. 
As previously argued, this Court reversed the trial court in Doe because there was not 
sufficient evidence to sustain a conclusion of a material and substantial change of circumstances 
and the Doe trial court did not reach its determination by an exercise of reason. See generally 
Doe v. Doe, 161 Idaho 67, 383 P.3d 1237 (2016). The Doe trial court found that the mother had 
engaged in alienating behavior, a finding that this Court reversed based on lack of evidence. Id. 
Part of the "alienating" behavior that the trial court had erroneously relied upon was a move from 
Rexburg to Idaho Falls. Id. This Court found that the father did not have the right to prevent such 
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a move, that he would have exercised the same visitation regardless of whether the mother was 
in Idaho Falls or Rexburg, and that the children would have maintained the same relationship 
with the father regardless of their location. Id. at 124 7. This Court, clarifying the standard for 
material and substantial change of circumstances, found that the Doe trial court specifically 
abused its discretion by failing to make any findings on how the move to Idaho Falls and other 
issues affected the children. Id. at 1248. 
On reconsideration, the Magistrate essentially found that Appellant had engaged in 
alienating behavior by failing to make B.G.S. 's relationship with Respondent a priority, despite 
no evidence on the record that Appellant did anything to interfere with Respondent's parental 
time. It appears, the Magistrate understood Appellant's desire to return to Virginia, a right she 
had under the 2013 Custody Order, as alienation. The application of Doe is completely on point 
and dispositive in this case, especially since the Magistrate in this case committed the same 
reversible error of not making any findings whatsoever on how these changes affected B.G.S. 
Just as the father in Doe, Respondent lacked the right to prevent a move to Virginia, such a move 
would not have affected his parental time as the 2013 Custody Order set out the parental time 
under the circumstance under which B.G.S. primarily resided in Virginia, and Respondent would 
have undisputedly been able to maintain the same relationship with B.G.S. 
The fact that Appellant agreed to remain in Idaho on reconsideration to address the 
Magistrate's apparent concerns about her returning to Virginia makes the conclusion of a 
substantial and material change of circumstances even more erroneous. Appellant's willingness 
to remain in Boise put the circumstances and the facts in this case back to the status quo, which 
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eliminated any possible claim for a substantial and material change of circumstance as things 
would remain the same as they had for a little over two years before trial. 
Similarly, Evans holding is relevant and appropriate. That Court upheld the trial court's 
determination that there was not a material and substantial change of circumstances based solely 
the mother's failure to attend school. Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 227-28, 254 P.3d 1219, 
1223-24. This Court found in Evans that the mother's long term plans had not changed, 
supporting the trial court's determination that there was not a material and substantial change of 
circumstances. Id. 
Here, Appellant's long term plans to reside in Virginia had not changed from the 2013 
Custody Order and trial. It was unfortunate that Appellant was forced back to Boise due to 
serious medical problems. On reconsideration, Appellant attempted to address the Magistrate's 
stated concerns regarding stability by agreeing to remain in Boise. This would have kept the 
status quo. Under either scenario, the Magistrate failed to provide any findings on how such 
alleged changes affected B.G.S., making his determination that there was a material and 
substantial change of circumstances erroneous. 
B. THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN CHANGING PRIMARY CUSTODY 
1. Appellant's reliance on Lamont was well placed and appropriate 
While Respondent claims that "Mother's reliance on any individual factual statements 
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[from Lamont] is misplaced and inappropriate"1, it was appropriate to cite cases where this Court 
has faced similar circumstances in the past and how it has ruled. Lamont is persuasive as the 
adequate education of the children and the employment of the mother were all factors that the 
Lamont Court addressed. See Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 356, 347 P.3d 645, 648 (2015). 
These are all factors that should have been important to the Magistrate to which he failed to 
adequately consider. 
2. Appellant's claims that the conclusions issued in the Magistrate's Order re 
Motion Reconsider was relevant and appropriate 
The Magistrate essentially determined that Appellant was engaged in alienating behavior 
by not making Respondent and B.G.S. 's relationship a priority and placing her career above said 
relationship. As argued previously, this is not the standard for alienation. Respondent has failed 
to provide a cogent argument as to why Appellant's previous arguments should fail. 
C. THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. The findings of fact in the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision and Order 
were inadequate as a matter of law. 
While Respondent argues that Appellant's arguments regarding the Magistrate's findings 
of fact are "incorrect and completely misstates [the Magistrate's 2017 Custody Order]", a close 
review of the Magistrate's findings of fact demonstrate that the Magistrate actually did not make 
any "findings." Rather, it just recited the testimony. There was no weighing the evidence. No 
1 It should be noted that Respondent makes the claim several times throughout his brief that Appellant's reliance on 
certain cases is not appropriate or relevant. Respondent failed to present a single case throughout his entire brief 
where he claims the holding is in his favor. 
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determinations on whose testimony was more credible when there was conflicting evidence. This 
failure to make actual findings is a reversible error. 
2. The finding in the Magistrate's Order re Motion to Reconsider that Appellant 
has not made any serious attempts to foster a good relationship between 
Respondent and BGS is not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence 
Respondent testified that his relationship with B.G.S. was great. The essence of the 
Magistrate's finding and Respondent's argument is that if a custodial parent is following a 
previous order that a court has determined is in the best interests of the child is not sufficient. 
Apparently, doing exactly what is ordered and required by law of a parent is not "fostering" a 
good relationship with the child and noncustodial parent. This Court should not allow such 
precedent to stand. It would toss the material and substantial change of circumstances out the 
window, allowing continual relitigation of issues already settled by courts, such as happened 
here. Custodial parents should be able to know with confidence that if they follow the custody 
schedules laid out by a court, then that is in the best interests of the child. The noncustodial 
parent should not be able to circumvent the previous order by claiming that the custodial parent 
did not "foster" a good relationship by actually following the custody order. 
3. The finding in the Magistrate's Order re Motion to Reconsider that Appellant 
is insensitive to the need of Respondent and BGS to have a good relationship 
is not supported by substantial and competent evidence 
If Appellant would have returned to Virginia, Respondent would have had the same 
visitation schedule that was specifically designed for Respondent to have a healthy relationship 
with B.G.S. This finding is confusing as the evidence presented on reconsideration was that 
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Appellant decided that to remain in Boise to address the Magistrate's concerns in its decision. 
Finding that Appellant cares more about her career when she specifically gave up the best thing 
for her career is beyond reason. 
4. The finding in the Magistrate's Order re Motion to Reconsider that 
Respondent will make Appellant and BGS 's relationship a priority is not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence 
Respondent's gut reaction when asked how he would handle important adolescent 
changes with B.G.S. was to direct B.G.S. away from her own mother. This is very telling. 
Respondent's reasons why he wants B.G.S., based on his testimony, boils down to he wants her 
in Shelley so she can go to school with her cousins. While extended family relationships are 
important, B.G.S. 's relationship with her mother is more important. B.G.S. undisputedly has 
separation anxiety when she has to leave Appellant for extended periods of time. Respondent's 
desire to remove B.G.S. from her mother shows that he does not value B.G.S. 's relationship with 
her mother. Furthermore, if every conclusion of law is unsupported by the applicable legal 
standard, was unsupported by the evidence, or was not reached through an exercise of reason, the 
conclusions of law as whole would have to be reached through an abuse of discretion. See 
generally Doe v. Doe, 161 Idaho 67, 383 P.3d 1237 (2016) (rejecting father's arguments that the 
totality of the circumstances rather than each individual incident at issue raised to a material and 
substantial change of circumstances). 
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D. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY ATTORNEY FEES TO RESPONDENT AND 
GRANT ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO APPELLANT 
1. Standard for Relief 
LC. § 12-121 allows for attorney fees on appeal if a case was defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 646, 289 P.3d 43, 48 
(2012). 
2. Appellant brings legitimate issues for this Court to determine 
As the arguments presented by Appellant show, there are serious questions as to whether 
the Magistrate abused his discretion in this case. Even if this Court ultimately rejects Appellant's 
arguments, it was brought in good faith and was not merely asking this Court to second guess the 
Magistrate. 
3. Respondent has defended this appeal in frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation manner 
Respondent has defended this case in a frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation 
manner. He has not presented a single case providing an analogy to support his position. He only 
has provided conclusory statements and made the false accusation that the cases cited by 
Appellant are misplace, inappropriate or irrelevant. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate abused its discretion in removing a child with separation anxiety and 
special education needs from the primary caregiver who had uniquely provided for her needs 
since the child's birth. Therefore, this Court should reverse Magistrate and reinstate the 2013 
Custody Order. 
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Respectfully submitted this 5th day of September, 2017. 
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